The Problematics of the Pareto Principle

Daniel A. Farber1
The Pareto Principle asserts in one form that an outcome that is unanimously preferred by
individuals should be chosen by society; or in another form that an outcome should be chosen if
it is preferred by at least one individual and the remaining members of society are indifferent. It
is little wonder that this principle, which has the ring of a self-evident truth, has been the “gold
standard” for law and economics. The normative foundations of the Pareto Principle are more
complex than they may appear. Despite its intuitive appeal, the Pareto Principle has limitations
that are irrelevant in some spheres such as corporate law, but that may have serious import for
fields such as constitutional law, family, and bioethics. Some of these limitations stems from
conflicts between autonomy and welfare norms; others from bounded rationality; still others
from ambiguities in the definition of “preference” or from subtle conflicts such as the Sen
Paradox between the Pareto Principle and other seemingly self-evident norms. The Pareto
Principle remains a useful rule of thumb, but it should not be followed blindly in all settings.
There can’t be many moral standards with more intuitive appeal than the Pareto
principle.2 The basic intuition is simple: If one person prefers a certain outcome and it does not
cost anyone else, society should give that person what he or she wants. This intuition seems
readily supportable on a variety of grounds. One ground is that society is only the sum of its
parts – if one person is better off and no one else is harmed, then society as a whole is better off.
A second is that we should honor people’s individual autonomy by respecting their preferences:
“[a]ll participants would by definition consent to a transaction which left them better off, or as
well off as before”; hence, “a moral analysis based on autonomy and consent would approve of
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transactions that were Pareto superior.”3 And a third is that society should care about the welfare
of its citizens and seek to promote their well-being.
But although the appeal of the Pareto principle is indeed attractive, its normative status is
actually quite complex. To begin with, the idea of a “preference” is by no means as clear-cut as
it may seem. In a number of situations, it is not easy to know whether we should focus on the
choices people actually make when they rank alternatives in advance (assuming that such
rankings in fact exist) or instead on their rankings after the fact, which might be different. Or
perhaps we should focus on the rankings they would have had if they had engaged in serious
discussion of the issue with their fellow citizens, or if they were better at probability theory, or if
they were more aware of what is actually good for their own welfare. And are we interested in
their rankings of outcomes or their rankings of decisions, which may or may not be consistent
with each other?
Moreover, the Pareto principle’s normative foundations are also a bit shaky. It is often
defended on the basis of its connection with social welfare. But for this connection to hold, the
preferences in question must qualify as legitimate indications of individual welfare. As we will
see, there are all kinds of reasons why we might not be willing to count the satisfaction of a given
preference as a genuine improvement in individual well-being. For the social welfare argument
to work, we must also be willing to embrace a purely individualistic concept of social welfare,
which is defensible but at least subject to debate. Alternatively, Pareto can defended on the basis
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of the liberal conception of autonomy.4 Here again, however, the connection turns out to be
subject to dispute. It has long been known that liberal autonomy and the Pareto principle may
sometimes conflict; and it now appears that the conflict is potentially serious. As a general
matter, Pareto stands for a form of paternalism rather than autonomy – we give people what they
want (or possibly, what they should want) rather than what they have actually chosen.
This essay catalogues the limitations of Pareto. Although these limitations have been
discussed somewhere in the literature (sometimes as limits on freedom of contract rather than
Pareto), putting them all together highlights just how far from being self-evident and universal
the Pareto principle really is. Part I begins with some background on the Pareto principle and its
significance. In Part II, we consider the ways in which preferences may be diverge from
individual or social welfare, and in Part III we examine situations where preferences are
contingent and therefore do not offer a firm basis for social choice. Part IV considers flaws in
preference formation due to the limits of human rationality. In Part V, we consider the
relationship between the Pareto principle and social choice theory. Finally, Part VI asks the
question, what is left of the Pareto principle?
After reading Parts II through V, the reader may well concluded that the Pareto principle
is as full of holes as Swiss cheese. Should it be abandoned on that account? I believe that the
answer is no (or at least, “not completely”), and that the Pareto principle can be a valuable
guideline to social policy. But it should be considered to be a rule of thumb rather than a
bedrock normative principle.
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I. Introducing the Pareto Principle
The Pareto standard arose out of nineteenth and early twentieth century debates about
utilitarianism. When economists abandoned the idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility, they
were left with a normative puzzle. Pareto provided the solution, as Bob Cooter explains:
If utilities cannot be summed, can economists say anything about public policy?
This is the problem to which Pareto found a solution that proved far more successful than
he could have hoped.. A Paretian analysis, as proposed by its inventor and greatly refined
by generations of economic theorists, first assumes that there is an initial distribution of
resources, which is given outside the model. Once the initial distribution is described, the
analysis proceeds to ask whether any reallocation of resources can make at least one
person better off without making anyone else worse off. If the answer is “Yes,” the
reallocation is a Pareto improvement. If the answer is “No,” the initial allocation is
Pareto efficient (also called Pareto optimal”). Starting with an allocation that is
inefficient, Pareto efficiency is achieved by reallocating resources until the opportunities
for Pareto improvements are exhausted.5
We can rephrase the Pareto principle as a comparison of states of the world. If at least
one person prefers State A to State B, and no one has the opposite preference, then society should
adopt State A rather than State B.6 (One could think of the motion to adopt State A as passing by
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a vote of 1-0, with the rest of the world abstaining.) Although the Pareto principle only holds
under restricted conditions, at least in those conditions it appears to provide an objective standard
for ranking one state of the world as unambiguously better than another. (Note that the Pareto
principle says nothing about what to do when people have conflicting preferences about states of
the world; the fact that one state is Pareto efficient but not the other is irrelevant. Thus, while
the Pareto principle does not endorse redistribution of wealth, it also does not condemn
redistributions.) This standard seems to have a core of common sense: if Mary wants to see
Movie #1 rather than Movie #2, and Bob either agrees with her or doesn’t care, then the couple
surely should go see Movie #1, which makes her happier and at worst makes no difference to
him.
True, the Pareto principle is not everything. Pareto optimality is, according to Amartya
Sen, “a very limited kind of success”: “[a] state can be Pareto optimal with some people in
extreme misery and others rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off
without cutting into the luxury of the rich.”7 Still, Sen says, though there many unappealing
states of the world are Pareto optimal, “it has been thought reasonable to suppose that the very
best state must be at least Pareto optimal.”8 So Pareto optimality seems to be at least a necessary
condition of the best outcome, though far from being a sufficient condition.
The Pareto principle is especially significant because its logic turns out to be far more
powerful than its modest formulation may suggest. Given some additional but fairly modest
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assumptions about continuity and about the form of utility functions, it turns out that the Pareto
principle implies that social decisions can be made only by combining individual utility
functions, eliminating any independent weight for concepts such as fairness. Thus, it is a very
short step from Pareto to full-blown welfarism.
Although the details of the proof are clever and sophisticated, the basic idea is simple.
The heart of the proof is follows. If some non-welfare factor really matters, then at least it must
be able to break ties between two states of the world that have equal welfare. If we assume
continuity, then the state of the world with the greater degree of fairness should still be favored
when two states of the world are very close but not tied in terms of welfare. This means that we
can end up favoring a state where welfare is lower, and it turns out that we can find such a state
that is actually Pareto inferior.9 We could avoid this result by dropping the assumption of
continuity. But dropping this assumption essentially presumes that the non-welfare value is
trumped by an infinitely small loss of welfare. So we can keep the non-welfare factor but only by
giving it virtually no weight at all. Thus, modest and intuitively appealing as it may be, the
Pareto principle potentially has far-reaching consequences.
The Pareto principle is generally considered to be the “gold standard” for policy analysis.
When a change in legal rules produces a Pareto improvement, the argument is over – or so it is
thought. While much dispute exists about Kaldor-Hicks efficiency10 and about the relevance of
distributional norms to law and economics,11 the Pareto principle is often taken by practitioners
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of law and economics as being beyond controversy.12 This is not surprising, for the Pareto
principle has a strong intuitive appeal. To quote Cooter again:
[Economic models of law] ask whether legal resources can be reallocated so as to make at
least one person better off without making anyone worse off. Thus the economic analysis
of law attempts to maximize the value of legal resources to the people who enjoy them.
For every wasteful law, a more efficient one could be substituted and the savings could be
distributed among the people affected by the change so that some are made better off
without making anyone worse off. Waste is, consequently, an irrationality to expunge
from law and policy.13
Who can possibly be in favor of wasting resources? Isn’t the Pareto principle one of
those rare moral precepts – a self-evident truth? Alas, its self-evidence is most apparent as a
distance, but begins to disintegrate when we examine it closely.
II. Preferences versus Welfare
Recall the homely example used in the previous section. If Mary wants to see Movie #1
rather than Movie #2, and Bob either agrees with her or doesn’t care, then the couple surely
should go see Movie #1, which makes her happier and at worst makes no difference to him. And
yet, on reflection, it is not so clear that the couple “should” see the first movie. Maybe Mary is
wrong: the second movie will give her more pleasure or expand her horizons. Or maybe she only
wants to go to the first movie because it will allow her to feel superior to Bob. That might not be
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a good thing. Or maybe they should talk over the decision, as a result of which they might
discover that it would be better for them as a couple (rather than as two individuals) to go to the
other movie. In our movie example, these are fairly trivial concerns – after all, it was a trivial
hypothetical – but in other settings, similar concerns may raise important moral questions.
Part of the appeal of the Pareto principle is found in a common paraphrase: society should
take an action “if one person is better off, and no one else is hurt.” But the principle itself is
actually stated in terms of preferences and not in terms of welfare. There is a reason for this:
preferences are presumably objective social facts, but determining a person’s true welfare
involves a normative judgment that most economists would prefer not to make. Yet the jump
from preferences to welfare is problematic. Without such a jump, Pareto only stands for the
notion that society should give people what they individually desire or at least what they think
they desire. But as the example of Bob and Mary indicates, it can be a mistake to confuse what
people individually desire with what makes them collectively better off.

A. Preferences and Individual Welfare
Imagine a one-person society: Robinson Crusoe on his island. For him, the Pareto
principle seems tautological: what Crusoe prefers, “society” (which is just another name for
Crusoe himself) also prefers. But does this give us any reason to believe that what Crusoe
prefers will actually increase his welfare? Is satisfying his preferences necessarily something we
should consider a good thing for Crusoe. Suppose a purely benevolent figure – call her Crusoe’s
Mom – is hiding on the island. Is it clear that Crusoe’s Mom should try to arrange matters so his
preferences will be satisfied as much as possible under the circumstances? It’s not at all clear
8

that she should do so, as we will see. She might try to satisfy his preferences in order to make
him feel happier or to make his life better (which might of course not be the same thing). But the
linkage between preferences and either happiness or welfare is contingent.
It might seem obvious that satisfying preferences makes people happier, but this is not
always true. In reality, satisfying people’s preference might or might not make them happier.
For example, studies by psychologists show that “the very wealthy do not have a substantially
more favorable perception of the quality of their lives than do the middle classes.”14 In contrast,
education “produces a greater sense of well-being than wealth equal to the education’s price.”15
In short, while most people have a preference for increased wealth, satisfying this preference may
not in fact be a good way of making them happier. It is even less clear that great wealth would
necessarily advance their “well-being” in any meaningful sense.16
“While being happy is a momentous achievement,” according to Sen, “it is not the only
achievement that matters to one’s well-being.”17 Or, as Judge Posner puts it, “Happiness is
important to most people, but it isn’t everything. How many of us would be willing to take a pill
that would put us into a blissfully happy dreamlike trance for the rest of our lives, even if we
were absolutely convinced of the safety and efficacy of the pill and the trance?”18
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The argument against equating the two, or otherwise defining well-being as a state of
mind, is nicely summarized by Hausman and McPherson:
Suppose there were an “experience machine” that could give people the highest quality
experiences possible. These high-quality experiences might be intense sensations of
pleasure or they might be experiences of climbing Everest or composing a symphony.
Let them be whatever experiences mental-state theorists of well-being claim are
ultimately and intrinsically good. The mental-state theorist would then have to say that
all people would be better off permanently hooked up to a reliable experience machine
rather than living their own lives and experiencing the decidedly mixed mental states that
come with them. If one believes that those who are hooked up to the experience machine
are missing out on some of the intrinsically good things in life . . . then one cannot accept
a mental-state view of well-being.19
The distinction between happiness and well-being is a classic issue regarding
utilitarianism. Completely decisive philosophical arguments do not exist but the argument
against defining utility as a mental state seems to come close. Yet, if we reject happiness as the
ultimate social goal, what do we use instead? Sen and others have argued for a richer conception
of human flourishing. In Sen’s version, for example, society should aim at extending human
capabilities.20
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needed to improve the capabilities of women in many countries around the world.21 Whatever
may be the merits of these or other efforts to define individual welfare objectively, we certainly
cannot assume that what people want on any given occasion will actually promote their objective
welfare. Thus, if we want to maintain a defense of the Pareto principle in terms of people being
“better off,” we must define the relevant preferences counterfactually, as the preferences people
would have had if they understood their true welfare.

B. Preferences and Social Welfare
Apart from questioning the linkage between preferences and individual welfare, we might
also question whether individual preferences invariably translate into some measure of social
well-being. There are three problems here: (a) satisfying some kinds of antisocial preferences
might not contribute to a better society, (b) we may not be able to aggregate individual
preferences in a straightforward way, and (c) we may think that society’s decision making
process should give people the opportunity to deliberate collectively over their preferences rather
than simply taken those as given. We discuss these problems in turn.
As to the first problem, it has often been suggested that some preferences, such as those
based on racism or sadism, do not deserve to be counted in making societal decisions.22 For
example, Hovenkamp argues that some preferences must be considered irrelevant because they
violate the premises of a constitutional democracy:
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A constitutional democracy with a meaningful bill of rights places limits on the
range of preferences that the state will recognize. For example, even if every citizen of
Smallville is an evangelical Protestant who favors Bible reading the public school, such
Bible reading is forbidden by the federal constitution. . . .
By its nature, a bill of rights removes some kinds of preferences from society’s
consideration, while it raises others to a privileged level.23
The idea of laundering preferences is also endorsed by Adler, one of the leading law school
advocates of welfarism.24
In contrast to Hovenkamp, Kaplow and Shavell argue that all preferences are equally
entitled to respect. We should not, therefore, discard preferences such as racism or sadism in
calculating social welfare:
To trump preferences is, in essence, to redefine individual’s well-being in a
manner that substitutes some other preferences – ones that are cleansed, so to speak – for
individuals’ actual preferences . . . But such an approach is troubling from the perspective
of welfare economics because the moral force and appeal of welfare economics lies in
promoting the actual well-being of people, not in advancing some hypothetical notion of
satisfaction that is distinct from that of the individuals who are the objects of our concern.
Furthermore, employing a cleansed version of preferences, rather than actual preferences
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may lead one to favor policies that make everyone worse off, just as when a notion of
fairness is pursued at the expense of individual’s well-being.25
Thus, they say, “[t]he idea of an analyst substituting his or her own conception of what
individuals should value for the actual views of the individuals themselves conflicts with
individual’s basic autonomy and freedom.”26
The trouble with the Kaplow and Shavell argument on this point, as we will see later, is
that the Pareto principle is only weakly linked with autonomy. One might instead argue on the
basis of liberal tolerance that society should count all preferences equally, even intolerant ones.
But this requires a very strong form of tolerance. It is one thing to argue against social
intervention to change or frustrate anti-social tastes. It is another to argue that society has a
collective interest in actually advancing those tastes (at least when doing so does not harm other
individuals) -- for example, that if people like telling racist jokes and society considers such
jokes harmless, a liberal society should actively try to promote opportunities for racists to tell
these jokes to each other. (And if we assume continuity, that means that society should continue
to promote those jokes even when they do some degree of harm to others.) Such an argument
would not be impossible to make but it is clear that we are far from the sort of self-evidence that
the Pareto principle originally seemed to promise.
Another problem with using the Pareto principle for making societal decisions also
deserves mention. There is a technical difficulty involved in applying the Pareto principle under
conditions of uncertainty. It is quite possible that people are unanimous in their preferences over
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choices, but have varying views about the outcomes and probabilities involved. Simply
aggregating the preferences may be misleading.27 For example, consider the question of whether
to adopt a policy requiring all welfare recipients to work. Liberals might support the policy
because they believe that it will prevent cuts in benefits levels, which they oppose.
Conservatives might support the policy because they believe it will lead to benefit cuts, which
they favor. So there is unanimous support for the proposal. But this does not mean that adoption
of the proposal will lead to a state of the world preferred by everyone over the status quo. In fact,
it is logically impossible for both liberals and conservatives to be satisfied, since either benefits
levels will go down or they will not.
Presumably, the solution to this problem is to apply the Pareto principle only to
preferences about outcomes, as opposed to preferences about decisions. The decision-maker
then applies her own best estimate of probabilities to determine whether a particular decision
would be Pareto preferred if the participants shared his best estimate of the outcomes.
Alternatively, the decision-maker could pool the probability estimates of the individuals
involved. But separating the probabilities and the preferences creates difficulties of its own.
Regardless of whether the decision-maker uses pooling or an independent assessment of
probabilities, the probability figure she derives will not generally correspond to those of the
affected individuals. It is even possible that she would find a policy to be Pareto optimal
although it is universally opposed, because she determines that using the correct probabilities,
everyone would prefer the expected outcome of the proposed action over the status quo. To the
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extent that attachment to the Pareto principle rests on a belief in individual autonomy, the
decision-maker is on questionable ground here.
This objection to rejecting individuals’ probability estimates disappears if our basis for
adopting the Pareto principle is individual welfare rather than autonomy. But the welfare
analysis becomes much more difficult than the Pareto principle seems to promise, for we can no
longer simply base the societal decision on actual individual rankings. Applying his own
estimate of probability (or a pooled probability) to the outcome preferences of the individuals
requires that the decision-maker have very good information about those preferences. Rather
than simply knowing that individuals choose action A or action B, the decision maker must be
able to attach cardinal utilities to the two outcomes in order to calculate expected utility. As a
practical matter, this may make application of the Pareto principle quite difficult.
A final difficulty in moving from individual preferences to social decisions is that we
might not want to take those preferences as pre-political “givens.” Communitarians believe that
“communities, through their collective choices, may decide to adopt some new conception of the
common good, and preferences are likely to adapt accordingly as individuals participate in this
process of political reconceptualization of their community values.”28 Going even further, some
comunitarians argue that private preferences are essentially irrelevant – what matters are not the
preferences a person would express in market transactions but rather the values she would
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express in her role as a citizen.29 The distinction is said to be that choices involve moral
commitments and beliefs rather than merely wants and desires.30

III.

Contingent Preferences

Preferences may depend on circumstances. “That some nontrivial part of people’s
preferences is a product of their environment, rather than logically prior to all experience, seems
so obvious that it is not worth debating.”31 Thus, some people “may want things precisely
because they cannot have them (‘the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence’),
while other people spurn what is beyond their reach, like the fox who judged the unobtainable
grapes to be sour.”32 No less an advocate of economic analysis than Judge Posner tells us that
“people’s preference often do not coincide with what a neutral observer would think good for
them or what they would think good for themselves if they lived in a different kind of society or
just if they knew more about alternative ways of living.”33

A. Before and After the Transaction
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Before the fact, the parties to a contract make think it will make them better off, but one
or both of them may be wrong. As Trebilcock points out, from an ex ante perspective, this later
regret is irrelevant, assuming the earlier decision was fully informed, rational, and voluntary. But
from an ex post perspective, performance of the contract is no longer Pareto optimal. Trebilock
calls this the “Paretian dilemma.”34 Economists strongly favor the ex ante perspective, which in
effect resolves the dilemma in favor of the earlier preferences of the parties.35 Others would
favor the use of ex post preferences. Indeed, they say, “the very point” of laws may be to
“cultivate and elevate preferences.”36
Although the ex ante perspective is not untenable, the normative case for it is far from
straightforward.37 Even where preferences have not changed, the ex ante perspective is not so
obviously the correct moral vantage point.
For example, suppose that two lawyers are trying to settle a case. They both prefer the
settlement to the risk of waiting for the jury to come back with a verdict. Thus, ex ante,
enforcing the settlement seems Pareto optimal, since it is preferred by both to the alternative of
non-settlement. Unbeknownst to either of them, the jury has already come back to the courtroom
with a verdict. When she learns this, the lawyer for the winning party prefers to nullify the
settlement. So ex post, the settlement is not Pareto optimal. It is not clear that her original
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consent to the settlement should be morally binding, or that the ex ante perspective on this
transaction is more valid than the ex post perspective. It is true that she consented to the
transaction, but only under a mistake of fact. (Of course, we might say that morally she assumed
the risk, but this seems rather circular – it assumes that she should have known she would be
morally bound even if the jury had already returned – and in addition there is no reason to think
that either party was consciously aware of this particular risk.) We may enforce such a contract,
but that is on the grounds of social utility rather than any a priori argument for applying the
Pareto principle ex ante.
To sharpen the issue, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine a society of sadists.
The Torture Show, a television program, kidnaps randomly selected individuals and tortures
them to death on camera. (In some ways, this is only an exaggeration of the basic idea of some
actual “reality TV” shows, where individuals are humiliated for the entertainment of others!)
Assume that the odds of being a victim are so small that ex ante, everyone would prefer to have
the show than not to have it. Ex post, however, the victims’ preferences regarding continuation
of the program are reversed – after all, they are sadists rather than being insanely masochistic.
(But note that the victim’s underlying goals have not changed -- he is still a sadist and still happy
to watch other people being tortured.) Does the Pareto principle require that the show continue?
One argument against the show is that sadistic preferences do not count; thus, even ex ante we
give no weight to the pleasure anyone might derive from watching and only count the expected
cost of being a victim. We will consider that argument later, but for the moment let us put it
aside. Is it clear that the ex ante perspective is appropriate here?
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The essential claim behind the ex ante perspective is that the victims would have accepted
the gamble in advance so that it is fair to hold them to it now. But there are two possible
arguments to the contrary, neither of which can be dismissed out of hand. The first counterargument is that, although the victims would have consented to taking the risk of becoming
victims, they did not actually do so. Even in the unlikely event that we have perfect information
about their preferences, their hypothetical consent may not carry the same moral force as actual
consent. To say that a person can be subjected to pain and death because he actually agreed to it
is one thing; to say that he could be so treated because he would have agreed seems much
weaker. The second counter-argument is that even actual consent might not be enough. Perhaps
it is not morally permissible to torture people to death for fun even if they have consented. This
second argument takes the idea of inalienable rights seriously -- people have a non-alienable right
to be free from this kind of conduct, which they retain even if they attempt to bargain it away.
If we endorse the Pareto principle, adopt the ex ante perspective, and refuse to launder
away tastes like sadism, then we are committed to endorsing The Torture Show. Part of the
power of this example is that the preferences involved are so distasteful, suggesting preference
laundering as a solution to the problem rather than abandoning the ex ante perspective. But there
are also scenarios with less distasteful preferences where the same problem arises.
For instance, assume that the death penalty is a highly effective way to deter crime (a
controversial assumption). It has always been in effect in the jurisdiction. For any citizen who is
not actually being executed at any given time, the crime control advantages outweigh the risk of
being executed in the future. John Doe, an innocent person, is now on death row. Must we say
that Doe has no reason to complain of being executed, because in the past he would have
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endorsed the death penalty if anyone had thought to ask him? It seems difficult to give this much
weight to a counterfactual act of consent. Even if he had consented, consent to a risk might not
automatically translate into consent to a harm. If capital punishment is adopted for reasons of
social policy, some risk of executing an innocent man is inevitable, but this seemingly makes
such an execution morally excusable, not morally desirable. (One might be tempted to say that
Doe has benefitted from the existence of the death penalty in the past, but this might not be
factually true – quite likely he personally would not have been a murder victim even without the
death penalty.) Are we committed to calling the death penalty Pareto optimal by disregarding an
innocent person’s current objection to being executed? And are we sure that even actual consent
to be wrongfully executed would be enough to justify the execution?
If we are not prepared to endorse the ex ante perspective universally, the Pareto principle
becomes ambiguous. Do we mean pre-transaction preferences or post-transaction ones? We
might rescue the principle, perhaps, by applying it only when no one would object to a
transaction either ex ante or ex post. But the number of legal problems involving such situations
must be vanishingly small. If everyone likes an idea in advance and like it after the fact, what
would they be doing in court?
In the examples we have considered, individuals’ basic values and tastes have remained
unchanged; it is only the circumstances that have changed. More profound problems are
introduced when the transaction actually causes changes in values and tastes, making it difficult
to determine which are the person’s “true” values. When a person’s goals have changed
substantially, it is not at all clear that his or her earlier goals should be privileged over later ones.
As Kronman says:
20

From the standpoint of his present values, which he cannot shake off or suspend, his past
actions may seem pointless or evil; in this respect, he is likely to regard his earlier
decisions as a foreign element whose continuing influence appears senseless from the
standpoint of his present goals.38
For example, addictions and habits reflect preferences which are themselves generated by past
behavior. In this situation, Kaplow and Shavell argue that we should accept the ex post
preferences of the individual as more accurate gauges of welfare. Thus, “if it is discovered that
individuals are able to adapt to certain physical disabilities more or less readily than is commonly
supposed, the valuations employed in measuring tort damages or in performing cost-benefit
analysis (for example, of highway safety improvements) should reflect actual harm rather than
the victim’s uninformed ex ante estimates.”39 This example seems dubious. If a person was
afraid of being maimed but later found that the pain killers made him happier than ever, we
would still be reluctant to call his being maimed a Pareto improvement.
Another example, which may be more favorable to the Kaplow and Shavell view, may be
presented by the issue of surrogacy contracts. When a woman enters into a contract to bear a
child for another couple, it may seem like a very favorable arrangement. But after giving birth,
she might unexpectedly find herself with a much different attitude toward giving up the child.
She might even feel that, having gone through the experience of childbirth, she is now a different
person than she was when she entered into the contract. A rule enforcing the surrogacy contract
is Pareto optimal based on ex ante preferences but not on the basis of ex post preferences.
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In such situations, the Pareto principle becomes indeterminate unless we simply resolve
the situation by fiat, as Kaplow and Shavell themselves do. On paternalistic grounds, perhaps
their solution might have something to say for it, but it is difficult to support on autonomy or
consent-based grounds – essentially it involves exposing people to risks that they would not
voluntarily undertake because we think we know better than they do how they will feel
afterwards. This is a strategy parents frequently adopt with small children (with mixed success).
It is less clear that such a strategy should be adopted by society toward its members. In any
event, this interpretation of the Pareto principle moves us far away from autonomy values toward
paternalistic supervision of individual welfare.
B. Before and After the Legal Rule
A particular problem arises when the legal rules themselves affect preferences.40 Then
the policymaker must decide beforehand which set of preferences to favor, a decision that
obviously cannot be made by looking at those preferences themselves.41
For instance, cognitive psychologists have established a recurring pattern in human
behavior: people will demand more to sell something than they would be willing to pay to buy it.
For example, in one experiment, students who were randomly given a candy bar instead of a
coffee mug were unwilling to trade for the mug, but those randomly receiving the mug were
equally unwilling to trade for the candy bar. This “endowment” effect is strongest when people
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feel some moral entitlement to what they possess, even if the grounds for such a feeling are
slim.42
In this situation, the Pareto standard is completely indeterminate. If people happen to
have coffee mugs initially, they universally prefer the mugs to the candy bars. Hence, it appears
that possessing mugs is Pareto superior to possessing candy bars. If they happen to start off with
candy bars, however, we find the opposite results. In particularly, if we are in the position of
assigning legal entitlements to mugs versus candy bars, we cannot apply the Pareto principle
because the preferences depend on how we assign the entitlements.
Again, this is less of a difficulty if we take a paternalistic view of Pareto than an
autonomy-based one. From the paternalistic view, we need merely decide which situation makes
people happier or better off – how they rank alternatives themselves or which they would choose
has no relevance except as evidence of what is really good for them. Of course, the paternalistic
Paretian is left with the considerable problem of determining on people’s behalf what is really
good for them.
Another instance of shifting preferences arises when adoption of a legal rule causes a
conceptual shift in how people regard the relevant transaction. One concern is that legalizing
certain market transactions will have harmful effects on how people view themselves and each
other. The Pareto principle is strongly linked with the idea of market transactions. Assuming
fully informed, rational, and uncoerced decisions, an agreement to exchange two commodities
must be a Pareto improvement – no one would agree to such an exchange unless it satisfied their
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preferences at least as well as the status quo. But society has always had doubts about certain
exchanges, such as the sale of sexual services, infants for adoption, and body organs. One
objection is that we should not transform sexual activities, children, or body parts into
commodities. Instead, we should view these things as integral to our definition of our selves, and
thus incapable of being property.43 A specific fear is that “permitting transactions such as these,
along with the market rhetoric and manifestations that accompany them, may change and pervert
the terms of discourse in which members of the community engage with one another.”44 For
example, “[o]ne concern with respect to legal sanctioning of inter vivos organ sales is that people
will begin to view their organs entirely as commodities.”45 Similarly, critics of surrogacy
contracts fear that such contracts will reinforce oppressive gender roles.46
Rather than being worried that a new legal rule will change preferences, we might
welcome this result if we believe that current preferences are distorted. One long-standing
concern about basing social policy on existing preferences is that those preferences may be
warped by existing oppressive institutions. As Sen says:
A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very little opportunities, and rather little
hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate
and affluent circumstances. . . . The hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the
dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or the over-exhausted coolie may all
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take pleasures in small mercies, and manage to suppress intense suffering for the
necessity of continuing survival, but it would be ethically deeply mistaken to attach a
correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being because of this survival
strategy.47
Worse, individuals may adjust to oppression and even come to prefer their oppressed
circumstances over the potential for freedom. For instance, women may adjust to sexist
expectations and develop preferences for limited career options and dependence on men.48 But
for these women, “liberties, high wages, and protection from domestic violence may make them
better off than giving them what they prefer.”49 If the legal rules are changed, perhaps they will
learn to value their new freedoms and benefits.
How much to worry about preference shifts is a serious question. We have relatively
little empirical evidence about how legal rules shape popular preferences. Sometimes,
significant effects seem apparent. For example, non-smokers frequently say they have become
much more aware of the unpleasantness of tobacco smoke since anti-smoking ordinances created
so many smoke-free public spaces. Even those who might have been indifferent originally to the
passage of the ordinances may strongly oppose repeal. In other arenas, effects may be more
mixed. Sexual harassment laws have no doubt made some men change their own views of
appropriate conduct in the workplace. But others no doubt view these laws only as an annoying
impediment to their activities. As a general matter, we know relatively little about how much
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legal rules are internalized over time. The more widespread this phenomenon is, the less useful
preferences at any given time are as guides to legal policy, and thus the smaller the scope for the
Pareto principle.
IV. Limited Rationality
Even if actual preferences are left unaffected by transactions or rule changes, they may
not provide a useful standard for societal decisions. It is no news, except perhaps to the most
sheltered economic theorists, that “[p]eople’s preferences are sometimes irrational in the sense
that they are not mathematically consistent with other preferences or perhaps in the weaker sense
that they simply do not seem intelligent in the light of the information that people have at the
time they make a choice.”50 Cognitive psychologists have documented an array of errors that
human beings are prone to.51 These errors make it harder to connect the proposition “individuals
prefer A to B” to the proposition “society should choose A over B.”
A. Cognitive Limitations
Sometimes people’s preferences are disarranged because of their inability to process
information. We cannot necessarily say as a result that any given preference is wrong. Rather,
we must say that preferences are out of alignment with each other – for example, that preferences
for specific outcomes when their achievement is a certainty are out of whack with preferences for
various probabilistic packages of outcomes. Given such inconsistencies, we cannot take
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preferences as given but must make adjustments. This necessarily involves a certain degree of
paternalism, further undermining the autonomy argument for the Pareto principle.
Thanks to the efforts of cognitive psychologists, we now know a good deal about human
intellectual limitations. For example, we know that humans make systematic errors in estimating
risks. They tend to be overly optimistic, thinking they are less subject to risks than the average
person. On the other hand, they overestimate risks based on the amount attention given to the
risks by the media. When an event has happened, they also overestimate the prior probability of
its occurrence. Thus, people’s decisions under uncertainty may reflect mis-perceptions of
probabilities rather than true preferences about outcomes.52
Preferences may also be disarranged because preferences over specific attributes do not
match preferences over complicated packages of attributes. When faced with complex tasks,
people take shortcuts. For example, rather than trying to find the optimal outcome, they
“satisfice” by settling for the first acceptable option rather than continue to search.53 Even when
given correct probability information, people mis-process the information, ignoring information
about base rates and focusing instead on the representativeness of an outcome.54
These cognitive deficits clearly make practical application of the Pareto principle more
difficult. We can no longer take completely for granted that voluntary, fully informed exchanges
meet the Pareto principle. What is less clear is whether irrationality causes any normative
difficulties for the Paretian. The effect of these cognitive difficulties is to take the analyst farther
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way from what people actually prefer regarding certain choices, and toward what people would
prefer if their thinking met the economist’s conception of rationality. Whether this is
normatively troublesome depends on our degree of toleration for paternalism. In any event, we
are once again pushed away from autonomy and preferences toward paternalism and objective
welfare as the basis for applying and justifying the Pareto principle.

B. Incomplete or Incoherent Preferences
Reliance on preferences can also be problematic when people have incomplete or
incoherent preferences. This leaves the Pareto principle impotent to the extent we are really
serious in phrasing it in terms of “preferences.” To the extent that “preference” is really just
shorthand for “what people would really prefer if they knew what was truly good for them,” we
can continue to endorse the Pareto principle, though only as a minimalist form of utilitarianism.
We can begin by considering situations in which people have seemingly inconsistent
preferences. For example, they frequently use a different discount rates for different time
periods, resulting in preference reversals due to the mere passage of time.55 This leads to
situation where it is rational to make a plan, which it will then be rational to break despite the
absence of any relevant change in preferences or circumstances. Similarly, people often demand
more for accepting a delay than they would be willing to pay to accelerate the same event.56 Such
situations, as well as those involving inadequate “will power,” can be described by ascribing
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different “selves” to the same person at different moments of time – in effect, the self who
decides on a diet is a different person than the self who later sneaks a candy bar.
Other inconsistencies seem to show that preferences in some sense do not exist until
people have reason to construct them, and that the results of the construction depend on the
context. For example, the choices people make in pricing risky alternatives are not always
consistent with their rankings of the alternatives.57 The general conclusion is that preferences are
constructed not found:
The discussion of the meaning of preference and the status of value may be
illuminated by the well-known exchange among three baseball umpires. “I call them as I
see them,” said the first. “I call them as they are,” claimed the second. The third
disagreed, “They ain’t nothing till I call them.” Analogously, we can describe three
different views regarding the nature of values. First, values exist – like body temperature
– and people perceive report them as best they can, possibly with bias (I call them as I see
them). Second, people know their values and preferences directly – as they know the
multiplication table (I call them as they are.) Third, values or preferences are common
constructed in the process of elicitation (They ain’t nothing till I call them). The research
[on preference reversal] . . . is most compatible with the third view of preference as a
constructive, context-dependent process.58
A somewhat similar problem of preference construction may exist when the choice is
between sharply disparate values, such as money versus human life, or career versus family.

57

See Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life 79-91 (1992).

58

Id. at 90-91.

29

Economists assume that preferences always exist between any two outcomes, so that a person
can readily make a choice. But a number of philosophers insist on the incommensurability of
values and our inability to give them all a common metric.59
If we support the Pareto principle because we truly care about fulfilling people’s
preferences, this gives us a real problem: people may not have any ascertainable preferences at a
given time. If instead, we are using Pareto as a stand-in for utilitarianism, we face some very
difficult measurement problems. Essentially, in the instances where people find themselves
stymied in making decisions for their own lives because of the difficulty of comparing radically
different values, we must be prepared to make the comparison for them if we are to apply
something like the Pareto principle.
We must also be willing to decide the “correct” way to frame specific choices, because
what people prefer is often a function of how choices are presented. Framing effects are one of
the best established findings in cognitive psychological. Choices depend not only on what
options are present but on how those options are presented. For example, people will see a
penalty for using credit cards differently from a bonus for using cash, and will respond differently
to the two.60 Yet, the economic substance of the two is exactly identical. Frames can lead to
inconsistent attitudes toward risk aversion, and can be affected by fairly small changes in
presentation.61
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A similar problem is presented by menu effects. If preferences are well-behaved, whether
A is preferred to B should not depend on how either compares with C. For example, suppose that
I prefer chocolate to vanilla ice cream, and both of those to strawberry. Then I should always
choose chocolate, regardless of which of the other two is on the menu. Yet in many situations,
individual choices turns out to be context dependent. For example, juries presented with certain
facts might choose a verdict of murder over a verdict of voluntary manslaughter if those are the
only two choices. But if they are also offered the choice of negligent homicide, they switch to
voluntary manslaughter. This is exactly like always choosing chocolate over vanilla, unless
strawberry is also on the menu, when you reject chocolate for your former second-choice of
vanilla.62
How are we to specify the “correct” setting for a decision, the one that will reveal what
people “really” prefer? It is difficult to see any alternative except picking the frame that is most
likely to lead people to the right choice, the choice that really furthers their welfare or happiness.
So the framing problem reinforces our growing suspicion that the Pareto principle is really just a
minimalist version of utilitarianism.
V. Preferences, Rights, and Social Choice
Even if preferences are perfectly connected with individual welfare and perfectly stable,
some questions remain about the Pareto principle. As we will see, accepting Pareto may force us
to abandon other desirable aspects of a decision-making process.
A. Autonomy and Pareto
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Amartya Sen proved that the following three conditions cannot be simultaneously
satisfied by any social choice function:
(1) The social choice method must apply to any possible array of individual preferences.
(2) The Pareto principle applies.
(3) Each individual gets the final say about the choice between at least one set of
alternatives (for example, whether that individual reads or does not read a specific book).
Thus, Sen observed, the Pareto principle seems logically inconsistent with a minimal conception
of liberalism in which individuals have the final say over even a single decision affecting
themselves alone.63 Sen provided a seemingly contrived example of this paradox, in which two
friends must decide whether one of them will read Lady Chatterly’s Lover. Because of the nature
of the example, it is not difficult to dismiss the paradox as a very clever but practically
insignificant hypothetical.64 Still, as Sen says, the logical implications are disturbing:
[I]t turns out that a principle reflecting liberal values even in a very mild form cannot
possibly be combined with the weak Pareto principle, given an unrestricted domain. If
we do believe in these other conditions, then the society cannot permit even minimal
liberalism. Society cannot then let more than one individual be free to read what they
like, sleep they way they prefer, dress as they care to, etc., irrespective of the preferences
of others in the community.65
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Sen concludes from such considerations that Pareto is “unacceptable as a universal rule.”66
Quite apart from Sen’s technical result, one must question the degree of the connection
between the Pareto principle and the idea of personal autonomy. The Pareto principle does not
merely mean that people are entitled to make choices. It also says that it is perfectly legitimate
for society to make choices for them, if society believes that the affected individuals will like the
results and no one else will be harmed. The ultimate grounding of the Pareto principle is not
autonomy but paternalism. As a practical matter, the best paternalistic strategy may be to let
people make their own decisions because they have better incentives or information about their
own preferences. But this is a purely contingent result; the Pareto principle does not preclude the
possibility that no individual would ever be allowed to make a decision about his own life
become some super-computer was better than they were at figuring out how to maximize their
preferences. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sen was actually able to prove a logical
inconsistency between Pareto and libertarianism.
In a recent book, Kaplow and Shavell extend Sen’s result to argue that Pareto is
inconsistent with any non-welfarist moral values such as fairness. They contend that “individuals
will be made worse off overall whenever consideration of fairness leads to the choice of a regime
different from that which would be adopted under welfare economics because, by definition, the
two approaches conflict when a regime with greater overall well-being is rejected on grounds of
fairness.”67 In particular, when people are symmetrically situated ex ante -- for example, equally
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likely to cause accidents or be accident victims -- Kaplow and Shavell say that it is “always the
case that everyone will be worse off when a nation of fairness leads to the choice of a different
legal rule from that chosen under welfare economics.”68 Their explanation is simply that:
Because everyone is identically situated, whenever welfare economics leads to the choice
of one rule over another, it must be that everyone is better off under the preferred rule.
Hence, whenever a notion of fairness leads one to choose a different rule from that
favored under welfare economics, everyone is necessarily worse off as a result.69
These are controversial arguments, but to the extent that they are accepted, they can as
easily be used to raise questions about the Pareto principle as about fairness or other moral
norms. One intuition is that a situation is better if everyone prefers it. Another intuition is that a
situation is worse if it violates human rights. If they are inconsistent, which should prevail? To
quote the title of one of their articles, Kaplow and Shavell prefer to say that Any Non-Welfarist
Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle.70 But they could just as well have
titled the article, The Pareto Principle is Inconsistent with Any Moral Theory Based on Fairness
or Human Rights. The two titles in fact mean exactly the same thing.
B. Pareto and Social Choice
If we are designing an institution for making societal decisions (i.e., a government),
should we insist that the institution’s decisions be consistent with the Pareto principle? This may
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seem desirable, but it could in practice conflict with other desirable characteristics of social
decision making.
As a matter of common sense, there seem to be a number of obvious attributes that any
system for making social decisions should have. One of them is the Pareto principle. Another is
that choices should be transitive: if society prefers A to B and B to C, then it should also prefer A
to C. Still another is that the decision should not be affected by the presence of irrelevant
alternatives: eliminating the least favored alternative from the agenda should not affect the
ultimate choice between the other, more favored alternatives. (Recall the effect of the strawberry
ice cream on the choice between chocolate and vanilla.) Alas, Arrow’s Theorem is only one of a
host of proofs that no mechanisms of social choice can satisfy some such set of obvious basic
requirements.71 Thus, we must sacrifice some desirable aspect of decision-making or another.
The only question is which one.
In some situations, it may well be the Pareto principle that should be sacrificed. For
example, majority voting systems are potentially subject to chaotic cycling, which could make
the legal regime dangerously unstable. In order to attain stability, it may be useful to introduce
some friction into the system, so that laws can only be passed if they make fairly large changes
that possess wide popular support. But this friction may block changes that would help some
small group of people without harming anyone else. Such a sacrifice of the Pareto principle may
be worthwhile in systemic terms.
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Similarly, we might sacrifice the Pareto principle to reduce transaction costs. Eliminating
waste sounds like a good idea, but like all good ideas, it may have diminishing returns. It may
simply not be worth the trouble of searching out every possible Pareto improvement; we might
do better to settle for an outcome that seems reasonably close to Pareto optimality. We might
also bend the Pareto principle to ensure that outcomes have other desirable qualities. For
example, in designing mechanisms for dividing goods among individuals, it may be impossible
to find one where the results are guaranteed to be Pareto efficient and also leave each individual
equally satisfied.72 We – or the individuals involved – might care more about equity than
efficiency.
The Pareto principle may also preclude recourse to other (non-preference based) values in
ways that are counter-intuitive. The logic here resembles Kaplow and Shavell’s argument for
excluding fairness, but applies to a broader range of values. Suppose, for example, that we
believe that animals have rights but that those rights are highly subordinate to human welfare.
Thus, animal rights become significant in making decisions as tie-breakers, when human welfare
is unaffected. For example, one might consider the impact of a decision on animal rights when
the affected humans have no preferences about the outcome one way or the other. This seems
like a very modest and reasonable position, even for someone who does not put much stock in
the idea of animal rights.
And yet, this position is incompatible with the Pareto principle, at least if we assume that
the social choice function is continuous. Consider two outcomes, A and B, and assume that all
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the affected humans are indifferent between them but that A is much better for animals. Then
society chooses outcome A. Now suppose instead that one individual has a minute preference for
outcome B. If the social choice function is continuous, then this tiny preference shift should not
change the result. So society still picks outcome A. But this violates the Pareto principle, for
now every affected person is either indifferent or prefers outcome B. Precisely the same
argument applies to environmental values such as the preservation of endangered species,73 or to
the preservation of great works of art. Thus, the Pareto principles means that if everyone else is
indifferent and one person has a faint distaste for Rembrandt, it is better for society to destroy all
of the Rembrandts in the world. This is far from being an intuitively compelling conclusion.
One might reasonably think that the world would be poorer if the last redwood or the last
Rembrandt were destroyed, even if everyone alive were too insensitive to care.
Thus, in at least some circumstances, we might be willing to allow modest incursions on
the Pareto principle, thereby tolerating a certain amount of economic inefficiency, because we
would like the decision-making process to have other desirable attributes. An ideal system for
making decisions would incorporate all of the features we desire, but unfortunately no such
system is possible. The Pareto principle does not seem uniquely entitled to a sacrosanct status if
such tradeoffs must be made.

VI. Conclusion
In the course of working on this essay, I found myself driven to three conclusions.
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The first conclusion is that the Pareto principle has no deep connection with individual
autonomy or freedom. Sen’s paradox is not just a clever parlor trick, but a symptom of a
profound gap between the Pareto principle and libertarianism. The libertarian believes that
people should get what they choose; the Paretian believes that people should get what they would
have chosen. Moreover, in a host of different circumstances, the Pareto principle either breaks
down because of the absence or inconsistency of the relevant preferences, or else it must be
rephrased in terms of individual welfare rather than individual preferences. Deep down, the
Pareto principle rests on paternalism not autonomy.
Second, partly for this reason, I have also concluded that the Pareto principle is a close
cousin of utilitarianism.74 The Paretian limits himself to the easiest cases for applying
utilitarianism, those where the only utility changes are positive. This eliminates the problem of
measuring utility, although we may still be perplexed about whether to consider the satisfaction
of certain tastes as genuinely improving individual well-being. But although it avoids some of
the practical problems of full-blown utilitarianism, it raises many of the same ethical issues.
Indeed, as we have seen, it takes only the addition of a continuity assumption to change the
Paretian into a utilitarian (or a close cousin). As with utilitarianism, we can hope that the Pareto
standard will ordinarily lead us to results favoring human liberty, equality, and other values. But
there is no guarantee that this will always be so, and in case of conflict, we must be prepared to
sacrifice human dignity and the like for greater social utility. Whether this seems problematic
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depends partly on how often we expect such conflicts to arise, and partly on whether we are
willing to abandon our other moral intuitions.
Third, although I am no longer willing to accept the Pareto principle as a self-evident
truth,
I continue to think that it is often a useful standard. But several conditions have to be met for us
to be willing to apply the Pareto principle with any confidence:
1.

To the extent that preferences are distorted by cognitive deficiencies or other factors, we
have to be sufficiently sure of our ground to be comfortable with making paternalistic
corrections.

2.

Preference satisfaction cannot conflict with another goal (if any) we hold dearly, such as
autonomy, individual rights, or cultural and environmental values.

3.

Preferences must be relatively stable, unaffected either by the transaction or the legal
environment.

4.

Making Pareto optimality an absolute requirement must not require undue sacrifice of
other desirable aspects of decision making such as stability or efficiency.
Most people will find that these conditions are satisfied at least some of the time, many

will find them satisfied often, and a few will find them satisfied always. Thus, the Pareto
principle is likely to remain a useful tool. But we should not imagine that Professor Pareto
showed us the way to normative bedrock.
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